wechat-styler
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Potential command injection in
scripts/convert.mjs. The script usesexecto run theopencommand on theoutputPathvariable, which can be controlled by a user via the--outputflag or the input filename. Because the input is not sanitized or shell-escaped, an attacker could provide a path containing shell metacharacters to execute arbitrary commands.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Potential command injection inscripts/generate-preview.mjs. This script usesexecSyncto execute the conversion script, interpolatingarticlePathandthemeNamedirectly into the shell command string. Maliciously crafted file paths or theme names could lead to code execution.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection.\n - Ingestion points:
scripts/convert.mjs(reads content from user-provided Markdown files).\n - Boundary markers: None present. The Markdown content is parsed and converted without isolation markers to distinguish instructions from data.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (
exec) and write files to the local system.\n - Sanitization: While HTML is escaped for the output, there is no validation of the Markdown content to prevent embedded instructions from being interpreted by the agent during processing.
Audit Metadata