leadbook
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts within the skill, such as
scaffold_leadbook.py,render-pdf.py, andprepare-pdf-visual-audit.py, usesubprocess.run()to execute system utilities includinggoogle-chrome,pdftoppm, andmontage. These calls are used to automate the build pipeline and generate visual assets. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
xhs-research.pyscript communicates with a local REST API to collect research data. While it defaults to loopback addresses, it includes a flag (--allow-remote-base-url) that allows sending short-lived session tokens to remote endpoints, which could be misused if a user is directed to an untrusted server. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8) by processing untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from Xiaohongshu notes and comments via
xhs-research.py, as well as WeChat articles referenced inAUTHORITY_ACCOUNTS.md. - Boundary markers: The skill documentation (
references/runtime-and-privacy.md) acknowledges that user-generated content is untrusted; however, the provided scripts do not automatically implement strict delimiters or 'ignore instructions' markers when interpolating this data into markdown files read by the agent. - Capability inventory: The agent possesses capabilities to execute shell commands (via provided scripts) and perform extensive file system operations within the project directory.
- Sanitization: The scripts perform basic data normalization but lack specific sanitization to filter out malicious LLM instructions embedded in the ingested social media content.
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