leadbook

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts within the skill, such as scaffold_leadbook.py, render-pdf.py, and prepare-pdf-visual-audit.py, use subprocess.run() to execute system utilities including google-chrome, pdftoppm, and montage. These calls are used to automate the build pipeline and generate visual assets.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The xhs-research.py script communicates with a local REST API to collect research data. While it defaults to loopback addresses, it includes a flag (--allow-remote-base-url) that allows sending short-lived session tokens to remote endpoints, which could be misused if a user is directed to an untrusted server.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8) by processing untrusted data from external sources.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested from Xiaohongshu notes and comments via xhs-research.py, as well as WeChat articles referenced in AUTHORITY_ACCOUNTS.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill documentation (references/runtime-and-privacy.md) acknowledges that user-generated content is untrusted; however, the provided scripts do not automatically implement strict delimiters or 'ignore instructions' markers when interpolating this data into markdown files read by the agent.
  • Capability inventory: The agent possesses capabilities to execute shell commands (via provided scripts) and perform extensive file system operations within the project directory.
  • Sanitization: The scripts perform basic data normalization but lack specific sanitization to filter out malicious LLM instructions embedded in the ingested social media content.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 27, 2026, 04:21 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — leadbook