skill-open-sourcer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and audit user-provided skill directories and
SKILL.mdfiles. This creates a surface where malicious instructions within the audited content could attempt to override the agent's behavior during the packaging process. - Ingestion points: Files are read in
scripts/scan_skill_release.pyandscripts/portfolio.py(via thescanfunction). - Boundary markers: The instructions define a strict workflow but lack explicit boundary delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when processing the content of audited skills.
- Capability inventory: The toolset possesses extensive capabilities including filesystem writes (packaging) and command execution via Git, Node.js, and Python across multiple scripts (
scripts/release_portfolio.py,scripts/verify_isolated_install.py). - Sanitization: The skill implements significant defensive measures, including a secret scanner (
scan_skill_release.py), a deterministic README and SVG auditor (audit_release_readme.py), and a capability detection module (portfolio.py). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several automation scripts utilize the
subprocessmodule to interact with the local environment. - Evidence:
scripts/check_release_env.py,scripts/git_sync_guard.py, andscripts/release_portfolio.pyall usesubprocess.runto execute Git operations and verify software versions. While these calls use list-based arguments, they represent the execution of system-level commands. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill workflow involves downloading external payloads and packages.
- Evidence: The workflow utilizes
npx skills addto fetch and install skills from remote sources, including thezjp1997720/zhijian-skillsrepository on GitHub. These operations target well-known package registries and the vendor's own infrastructure.
Audit Metadata