web-clipper
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 4, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/bootstrap.shscript invokes multiple system package managers (apt-get,dnf,yum,pacman,brew,winget,choco) to install the Python 3 runtime environment. It specifically usessudo -nto attempt non-interactive privilege escalation for these installations. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]:
scripts/clip_articles.pyexecutesnpx -y defuddle@0.19.2, which involves downloading and running code from an external registry (npm) at runtime. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill communicates with several external APIs and services to extract article content, including
api.fxtwitter.com,metaso.cn(Reader API), andr.jina.ai(Jina Reader). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted content from the web and writes it to the local filesystem without robust content sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Article content is fetched from arbitrary URLs via the
fetchandparse_articlemethods inscripts/clip_articles.py. - Boundary markers: The output Markdown files use YAML frontmatter as a structural boundary, but provide no instruction-level isolation or explicit warnings for the agent regarding the article body content.
- Capability inventory: Includes local file writing (
Path.write_text), network requests (urllib.request), and system command execution (subprocess.run). - Sanitization: Content processing is limited to HTML entity unescaping and whitespace normalization, which is insufficient to prevent malicious instructions embedded in web pages from influencing the agent's behavior.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata