skill-content-gap-analysis
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is configured to fetch real-time social media trend data from external third-party API providers, including
60s.viki.moeandv2.xxapi.cn. While these are used to retrieve public hotlists for platforms like TikTok (Douyin), Bilibili, and Weibo, they represent network operations to non-whitelisted domains. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill analyzes untrusted content such as user comments and search results from platforms like Xiaohongshu and Bilibili, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through
web_fetchcalls to social media content pages and comment sections as described inSKILL.md(Step 3) andreferences/demand-signals.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to prevent the agent from executing instructions that might be embedded within the social media comments it processes.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
web_searchandweb_fetchcapabilities; however, no file system write operations or arbitrary shell command execution were identified. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization, filtering, or escaping mechanisms for the external data before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata