skills/zju-real/easel/tts-voiceover/Gen Agent Trust Hub

tts-voiceover

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-provided text (via the --text parameter) or file content (via the --file parameter) as input for its text-to-speech engine. This content is interpolated into command-line arguments for the execution of internal scripts.
  • Ingestion points: User input entering the system through parameters defined in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety warnings for the agent to apply when handling user-provided text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses subprocess calls to execute python, edge-tts, and ffmpeg via the scripts tts.py, audio_ops.py, and video_ops.py.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There are no explicit instructions to sanitize or validate user input before it is passed to shell-based commands.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates by executing various commands and scripts through the subprocess module.
  • Evidence: EASEL-META.md documents the use of subprocess to call external tools such as edge-tts and ffmpeg. SKILL.md provides multiple command-line examples for synthesis, mixing, and normalization.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 16, 2026, 04:32 AM