tts-voiceover
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-provided text (via the
--textparameter) or file content (via the--fileparameter) as input for its text-to-speech engine. This content is interpolated into command-line arguments for the execution of internal scripts. - Ingestion points: User input entering the system through parameters defined in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety warnings for the agent to apply when handling user-provided text.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses subprocess calls to execute
python,edge-tts, andffmpegvia the scriptstts.py,audio_ops.py, andvideo_ops.py. - Sanitization: Absent. There are no explicit instructions to sanitize or validate user input before it is passed to shell-based commands.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates by executing various commands and scripts through the
subprocessmodule. - Evidence:
EASEL-META.mddocuments the use ofsubprocessto call external tools such asedge-ttsandffmpeg.SKILL.mdprovides multiple command-line examples for synthesis, mixing, and normalization.
Audit Metadata