doc-coauthoring
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality of reading and processing external data.
- Ingestion points: The workflow retrieves content from external sources including shared document links (Google Drive, SharePoint), messaging channel threads (Slack, Teams), and user-provided template files as described in Stage 1 and Stage 2.
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or specific 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the data ingested from external channels, which could allow malicious instructions in those sources to influence agent behavior.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes file-system tools such as
create_fileandstr_replaceto generate and modify document content based on the gathered context. It also leverages network-based integrations (connectors/MCP servers) to access external data. - Sanitization: There are no instructions for the agent to sanitize, escape, or validate the integrity of the content retrieved from external messaging or document platforms before drafting.
Audit Metadata