google-direct-oauth
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion and processing of untrusted data from external sources, creating an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: The skill retrieves email content and calendar event details via the Google API helpers in
scripts/google_auth.pyandscripts/api-notes.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to differentiate between user instructions and the data retrieved from external APIs.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted capabilities to read, send, and modify emails and calendar events, which could be abused if malicious instructions are present in processed data.
- Sanitization: The provided Python helpers do not include logic to sanitize or filter the content retrieved from Google services before it is passed to the agent's context.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill manages and stores sensitive authentication credentials.
- Credential Storage: OAuth client secrets and refresh tokens are stored in plain text within the
/home/.z/google-oauth/directory (client_secret.jsonandtoken.json). While this is standard for local OAuth implementations, it exposes the credentials to any process with access to the user's home directory. - Network Activity: The skill performs network operations to
oauth2.googleapis.comto exchange authorization codes and refresh tokens. These operations target a well-known service and are consistent with the skill's primary purpose.
Audit Metadata