docx-template-translator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external files (LaTeX, Markdown, PDF, DOCX) and uses text markers (e.g., '摘要', '中 文 摘 要') to define formatting scopes and protected regions. A maliciously crafted document could attempt to manipulate the processing logic by spoofing these markers.
- Ingestion points:
template.docx,body-docx, and source project files (.tex, .md) read by the various scripts. - Boundary markers: The skill employs
formatting_start_markerandformatting_end_markerto scope formatting passes and protect native front matter. - Capability inventory: File system read/write (via
zipfile,shutil,tempfile), and system automation (viawin32comto control Microsoft Word). - Sanitization: Scripts use a
normalize()function to strip whitespace before matching markers, but no complex sanitization of embedded document text is performed. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing several bundled Python scripts that interact with the local operating system and Microsoft Word. While these are necessary for the skill's function, they represent a significant capability tier.
- [SAFE]: The
finalize_word_docx.pyscript implements a security best practice by settingAutomationSecuritytomsoAutomationSecurityForceDisable. This prevents the execution of potentially malicious VBA macros when opening user-supplied Word templates. The environment variable adjustments in the same script are documented as necessary workarounds for COM stability in non-interactive environments.
Audit Metadata