airflow-software-factory
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides an installation command referencing a remote repository at
https://github.com/zozo123/ariflow-swfactory. The repository name contains a typo ('ariflow' instead of 'airflow') compared to the skill's name and documentation, which is a suspicious naming pattern despite the author 'zozo123' matching the skill metadata. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process GitHub issues as 'work orders', which are then used to drive agenticSpec and Plan stages. This creates an indirect prompt injection vulnerability surface.
- Ingestion points: External GitHub issue bodies are ingested and preserved as 'intent' text in
docs/factory/<issue>/intent.md. - Boundary markers: The skill documentation (SKILL.md, references/sandboxes.md) emphasizes the use of sandbox providers like E2B, Daytona, and Docker to isolate agent cells, though it requires 'intent' text to be preserved verbatim.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute subprocesses (
uv run swfactory), perform file system writes, and manage git commits. - Sanitization: The skill documents terminal escape sequence sanitization for operator interfaces in
references/operator-interface.mdbut lacks specific sanitization or filtering for the 'intent' text before it is used in agent prompts. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on various CLI tools and scripts including
uv run swfactory, a native binary namedswf, and helper scripts likescripts/snapshot_diff.py. These tools execute commands and logic derived from the repository environment.
Audit Metadata