airflow-software-factory

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides an installation command referencing a remote repository at https://github.com/zozo123/ariflow-swfactory. The repository name contains a typo ('ariflow' instead of 'airflow') compared to the skill's name and documentation, which is a suspicious naming pattern despite the author 'zozo123' matching the skill metadata.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process GitHub issues as 'work orders', which are then used to drive agenticSpec and Plan stages. This creates an indirect prompt injection vulnerability surface.
  • Ingestion points: External GitHub issue bodies are ingested and preserved as 'intent' text in docs/factory/<issue>/intent.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill documentation (SKILL.md, references/sandboxes.md) emphasizes the use of sandbox providers like E2B, Daytona, and Docker to isolate agent cells, though it requires 'intent' text to be preserved verbatim.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute subprocesses (uv run swfactory), perform file system writes, and manage git commits.
  • Sanitization: The skill documents terminal escape sequence sanitization for operator interfaces in references/operator-interface.md but lacks specific sanitization or filtering for the 'intent' text before it is used in agent prompts.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on various CLI tools and scripts including uv run swfactory, a native binary named swf, and helper scripts like scripts/snapshot_diff.py. These tools execute commands and logic derived from the repository environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 7, 2026, 09:13 PM