Self-Referential Self-Improvement
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to treat its own instructions, logic, and system prompts as "mutable targets." This pattern allows the agent to self-modify and potentially override or remove platform-level safety guidelines, ethical constraints, or operational boundaries.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The implementation pattern requires the use of shell commands and file system operations, specifically utilizing
git worktreeand directory management (.hyperagents/) to automate the modification and archiving of code artifacts. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection during the evolutionary fitness evaluation phase.
- Ingestion points: Processes various code artifacts (SKILL.md, agents/*.md) and untrusted sample inputs used to score the agent's performance.
- Boundary markers: None; the skill lacks delimiters or specific instructions to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within the data it evaluates.
- Capability inventory: Includes file-write access to modify skill and agent definitions, and subprocess execution via
gitfor environment management. - Sanitization: None; there is no validation or filtering process for the mutations generated by the meta-agent before they are applied to the codebase.
Audit Metadata