notemdpro-text-translator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Content from local markdown files is read into the agent context via the
read_filefunction described in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The prompt template in
promptUtils.tsuses a simple 'Text to translate:' label but lacks structural delimiters or explicit instructions to disregard any commands embedded in the note content. - Capability inventory: The skill has filesystem access to read and write files (
read_file,write_file). - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the input
{TEXT}variable is documented or implemented before it is interpolated into the prompt.
Audit Metadata