sre-engineer
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts within the skill and its reference files utilize
subprocess.runto perform administrative actions. This includes Kubernetes operations viakubectl, service management viasystemctl, and low-level network manipulation usingiptablesandtcfor chaos engineering simulations. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: An automation script in
SKILL.mdimplements a control loop that fetches metrics from a Prometheus API and uses the results to trigger akubectl rollout restart. This pattern creates a dependency where external monitoring data directly influences high-privilege command execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
AutomatedRunbookimplementation inreferences/automation-toil.mdusessubprocess.runwithshell=Trueto execute runbook steps. This practice increases the risk of command injection if command strings are dynamically generated or modified by the agent or user input. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to reach a Prometheus instance (
http://prometheus:9090). Although this is typically an internal service, the capability to fetch data that subsequently controls system state is a sensitive attack surface. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data (Prometheus metrics) to make automated decisions. This represents an indirect prompt injection surface where manipulated metrics could theoretically influence the agent's logic or the parameters passed to administrative scripts.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: http://prometheus:9090/api/v1/query?query={urllib.request.quote(query)} - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata