nmt-upgrade

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to download and immediately execute scripts from https://nextmovetheory.com/install.sh and https://nextmovetheory.com/install.ps1 using curl | bash and Invoke-RestMethod | Invoke-Expression patterns. This bypasses security reviews by allowing unverified remote content to execute arbitrary shell commands.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on resources from nextmovetheory.com, which is not a recognized trusted vendor or well-known service, increasing the risk of supply-chain attacks.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads the contents of the local file .nmt-version and appends it to a network request sent to https://nextmovetheory.com/version. This pattern demonstrates the exfiltration of local file data to an external server.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes unverified output from a remote installer.
  • Ingestion points: Installer script output and git status results in the SKILL.md file.
  • Boundary markers: None present; the agent is instructed to report the output directly.
  • Capability inventory: Shell execution capabilities (bash) are present in the skill.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the remote output is performed before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://nextmovetheory.com/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Aug 15, 2026, 09:30 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — nmt-upgrade