nmt-upgrade
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to download and immediately execute scripts from
https://nextmovetheory.com/install.shandhttps://nextmovetheory.com/install.ps1usingcurl | bashandInvoke-RestMethod | Invoke-Expressionpatterns. This bypasses security reviews by allowing unverified remote content to execute arbitrary shell commands. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on resources from
nextmovetheory.com, which is not a recognized trusted vendor or well-known service, increasing the risk of supply-chain attacks. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads the contents of the local file
.nmt-versionand appends it to a network request sent tohttps://nextmovetheory.com/version. This pattern demonstrates the exfiltration of local file data to an external server. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes unverified output from a remote installer.
- Ingestion points: Installer script output and
git statusresults in theSKILL.mdfile. - Boundary markers: None present; the agent is instructed to report the output directly.
- Capability inventory: Shell execution capabilities (
bash) are present in the skill. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the remote output is performed before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://nextmovetheory.com/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata