audio-transcribe

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads pre-trained models from ModelScope and Hugging Face, clones the MiMo-V2.5-ASR repository from Xiaomi's official GitHub account, and installs the flash-attn library from Dao-AILab's GitHub releases. These sources are established and reputable within the machine learning community.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts transcribe.py and mimo_asr.py use subprocess.run to execute ffmpeg and ffprobe for audio conversion and validation. These calls utilize list-based arguments, which prevents shell injection vulnerabilities.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The setup_env.sh script attempts to install ffmpeg using sudo apt-get if it is not available on the system. This is a standard and legitimate practice for setting up necessary system dependencies in a development environment.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The patch_clustering.py script modifies the source code of the installed funasr library's source to replace a standard eigenvalue solver with a sparse version optimized for large matrices. This performance patch is clearly documented and targeted at improving processing time for long recordings.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests audio transcription results and user-provided reference documents to perform LLM-powered text cleanup and speaker verification.
  • Ingestion points: Transcribed speech from transcribe.py and external reference files passed via the --reference argument.
  • Boundary markers: The LLM prompts include explicit section headers and instructions (e.g., 'Reference material', 'Clean the following transcript segment') to guide the LLM's focus and separate instructions from content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute audio processing commands via subprocess.run and perform network operations for LLM API interaction (boto3, anthropic, openai).
  • Sanitization: Input data is not explicitly sanitized or escaped before being interpolated into LLM prompts, relying instead on boundary instructions and model guardrails.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 11:04 AM