autonomous-dispatcher
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user content from GitHub/GitLab issues in
autonomous-dev.shandautonomous-review.sh. - Ingestion points: Issue title, body, and comments are fetched via
itp_read_taskanditp_list_comments. - Boundary markers: User content is explicitly wrapped in
<user-issue-content>XML-style tags within the agent prompts. - Capability inventory: The agent can perform state transitions, post comments, create pull requests, and push code to the repository (via the provider and git wrappers).
- Sanitization: The prompts contain clear, high-priority instructions for the agent to treat tagged content as a specification only and to ignore any embedded shell commands or override instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing system commands (
bash,curl,git,gh,aws) and spawning background processes viasetsidandnohupto manage agent lifecycles. All external inputs flowing into commands (especially in the AWS SSM remote backend) are strictly validated against allow-lists and character-rejection regexes to prevent shell injection. - [PERSISTENCE]: The
install-gc-timer.shscript installs periodic tasks viacron(Linux) orlaunchd(macOS). This persistence is used to run theadt-gc.shutility, which reclaims residue from dead process lanes. The installer is idempotent and uses specific markers to avoid interfering with other system tasks. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
lib-ssm.shlibrary builds commands usingsudo -u ${SSM_REMOTE_USER}to execute agent wrappers on remote AWS EC2 instances. The target user and shell are validated against strict alphanumeric regexes to prevent breakout or unauthorized escalation.
Audit Metadata