scrape-codegen

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates user-controlled arguments (spec_path, project_dir, and fixture_class_path) directly into bash command blocks in Step 3 and Step 6. If a user provides an argument containing shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &, |), it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from external sources and passes it to secondary agents.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads content from {spec_path}/spec.json, {spec_path}/pages/*.html, and {spec_path}/values/*.json in Step 1 and Step 4.
  • Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions telling the agent to ignore embedded instructions within the processed data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Bash tool, Write tool, and the ability to trigger code generation agents (/scrape-codegen-analyze, /scrape-codegen-generate).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content read from the external spec files before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 18, 2026, 09:08 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — scrape-codegen