scrape-codegen
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates user-controlled arguments (
spec_path,project_dir, andfixture_class_path) directly into bash command blocks in Step 3 and Step 6. If a user provides an argument containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&,|), it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from external sources and passes it to secondary agents.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads content from
{spec_path}/spec.json,{spec_path}/pages/*.html, and{spec_path}/values/*.jsonin Step 1 and Step 4. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions telling the agent to ignore embedded instructions within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool,Writetool, and the ability to trigger code generation agents (/scrape-codegen-analyze,/scrape-codegen-generate). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content read from the external spec files before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata