scrape-codegen-analyze
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The skill reads and processes untrusted HTML data (including scripts, JSON-LD, and meta tags) from a user-specified path. This data is incorporated into an analysis report and summary intended for a downstream agent with code-generation and file-writing capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Reading HTML content from
page_html_path. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the scraped HTML.
- Capability inventory: The analysis is consumed by a code-generation agent that likely possesses
WriteandBashcapabilities to produce extraction code. - Sanitization: No validation or escaping of the HTML content is specified before it is summarized or included in the JSON output.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Potential Command Injection. The skill instructions direct the agent to execute bash commands using variables (
work_path,page_id) derived from the positional arguments of the raw$ARGUMENTSstring. - Evidence: The template commands
mkdir -p {work_path}/codegen-analyzeanduv run ... -o {work_path}/codegen-analyze/{page_id}.cleaned.htmlinterpolate these variables directly. If the input arguments contain shell metacharacters like semicolons or backticks, it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system.
Audit Metadata