memory-management
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it interprets and acts upon data stored in external files (working memory and deep memory).
- Ingestion points:
CLAUDE.mdand thememory/directory files (glossary.md, people/.md, projects/.md) are read at runtime to decode user requests and influence agent behavior. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are used to distinguish between system-trusted instructions and potentially untrusted content within the memory files.
- Capability inventory: The agent uses retrieved memory to interpret intent, draft communications (e.g., Slack/Email), and execute project workflows.
- Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or schema validation is performed on the content of the memory files before processing.
Audit Metadata