extracting-agent-skills
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the agent to fetch and load methodology from an external GitHub repository if the local version is unavailable. This creates a dependency on untrusted remote content.
- Evidence:
references/empirical-tuning-gate.mdreferenceshttps://github.com/mizchi/skills/blob/main/empirical-prompt-tuning/SKILL.mdas an external methodology source to be loaded by the agent. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process and analyze a wide array of untrusted project artifacts, including logs, code, and history, which provides a significant surface for adversarial content to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill analyzes
instructions, source, tests, scripts, commands, logs, errors, reviews, history, and outputsfrom potentially untrusted projects. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific delimiters or guardrails to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the data being analyzed.
- Capability inventory: The skill produces and validates new agent capabilities, which may involve file writing and execution via a 'fresh executor'.
- Sanitization: There is no process defined for filtering or sanitizing the input data to remove potential prompt injections.
Audit Metadata