autonomous-agent-harness
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Downloads and configures MCP servers from Anthropic's official registry, which are trusted sources.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it is designed to ingest and act upon untrusted data from external environments.
- Ingestion points: Processes data from GitHub notifications, PR bodies, calendar events, and external search results as defined in the 'Example Workflows' section of SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: Absent; the prompts used in scheduled tasks do not include delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the fetched data.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses significant capabilities including file system writes (memory), GitHub API interactions (posting comments), and browser/desktop control (computer-use MCP).
- Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of external content before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Uses programmatic mode (
claude -p) andnpxto initialize tasks and load MCP servers. While these are powerful capabilities, they are used here according to standard platform practices.
Audit Metadata