closing-checklist
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection Surface: The skill is designed to automatically ingest and reconcile data from various external and upstream sources, which could potentially contain untrusted instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data is gathered from Mode 2 (upstream outputs like
diligence-issue-extraction,material-contract-schedule, anddeal-team-summary), Mode 1 (external web research for regulatory mechanics), and thedataroom-watcheragent (which pulls updates from email and Slack). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when processing these diverse inputs into the YAML checklist.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs file read and write operations on
closing-checklist.yamlwithin the~/.claude/plugins/config/directory based on the ingested data. - Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions for sanitizing, validating, or filtering the content retrieved from external communications (email/Slack) or diligence findings before they are appended to the checklist.
- Specific File Path Usage: The skill operates within specific directories under
~/.claude/plugins/config/claude-for-legal/. While these are targeted paths necessary for the skill's stated purpose of managing legal deal records, the access pattern should be noted as part of the operational scope. - Professional Safety Guardrails: The skill incorporates a safety gate ("Consequential-action gate") that prompts for attorney review before producing final legal certifications. This represents a positive practice by adding a human-in-the-loop checkpoint for high-consequence actions.
Audit Metadata