cowork-plugin-customizer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection Surface: The skill is designed to ingest data from various external sources to automate the customization process. If these sources contain malicious instructions, there is a risk the agent could be influenced.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads plugin source files from
mnt/.local-pluginsandmnt/.plugins. It also queries Knowledge MCPs for Slack messages, emails, and internal documents in Phase 1. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the external data being processed.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to modify files within the plugin directories and execute shell commands (
find,grep,zip,cp) via the agent's environment. - Sanitization: There are no mentioned processes for validating or sanitizing the content retrieved from external search results before it is used to modify the plugin configuration.
- Command Execution Capability: The skill instructs the agent to use standard shell utilities to manage the plugin files.
- Evidence: The workflow includes instructions for using
findto locate directories,grepto identify placeholders, andzip/cpto package the final output inSKILL.md. - Context: While these commands are used for legitimate file management tasks defined in the skill, they represent a high-privilege interface that requires careful handling when combined with untrusted input.
Audit Metadata