internal-comms

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection Surface: The skill is designed to ingest large amounts of unstructured data from Slack, Google Drive, Email, and Calendars to generate summaries, newsletters, and FAQs. This represents a potential vulnerability surface where malicious instructions embedded in that external data could influence the agent's behavior during the generation process.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads from Slack channels, Google Drive documents, emails, and calendar events across multiple guideline files (examples/3p-updates.md, examples/company-newsletter.md, examples/faq-answers.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' prompts when processing this external data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to read extensive organizational data and output formatted text that may be distributed via Slack or email.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering logic to detect or ignore prompt injection attempts hidden within the source communications.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 12:03 AM