xlsx
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Dynamic Execution via Runtime Compilation and Injection: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains an embedded C source shim that is compiled at runtime usinggccand then injected into the LibreOffice process via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. This is a highly sophisticated technique used here to facilitate communication in sandboxed environments where standard socket operations are restricted. While this represents a complex execution pattern, it is used to enable the core recalculation feature of the skill. - System Command Execution: The skill makes several calls to external system utilities using the
subprocessmodule. These include invokingsofficefor formula recalculation inscripts/recalc.py,gccfor the environment shim inscripts/office/soffice.py, andgitfor document diffing inscripts/office/validators/redlining.py. These executions are central to the skill's advertised functionality. - Indirect Prompt Injection Surface: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted spreadsheet and document data, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the parsing of OOXML files (e.g.,
document.xml,workbook.xml) inscripts/recalc.pyand various scripts inscripts/office/validators/. - Boundary markers: Explicit boundary markers for ignoring embedded instructions in ingested spreadsheets were not observed in the provided scripts.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to execute shell commands (via
soffice,gcc), write files (viaopenpyxlandPath.write_bytes), and perform network-related operations if LibreOffice is configured to do so. - Sanitization: The skill effectively uses the
defusedxmllibrary inscripts/office/validators/base.pyandredlining.py, which is a recognized safety practice to mitigate XML-based vulnerabilities.
Audit Metadata