social-media-posting
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, including social media post histories, search results, and thread content, to inform its deduplication logic and engagement activities. The instructions do not define boundary markers or sanitization procedures for this external content before it is interpolated into prompts for content generation. A malicious post or thread could theoretically include instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during these steps.
- Ingestion points:
xurl timelineandxurl searchresults, Discord and Telegram message history reading, and web scraping of profiles and threads using Puppeteer. - Boundary markers: None are specified for the processing of external social media content.
- Capability inventory: The skill can publish content via
xurland platform APIs, execute UI actions throughpeekaboo(click, type, hotkey), and run system commands likeffmpeg. - Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit sanitization or filtering logic for external data prior to its use in generating drafts or replies.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses several command-line tools for its core functionality, including
xurlfor X/Twitter interactions,ffmpegfor video processing, andpeekaboofor macOS UI automation. It also makes use ofcurlto communicate with platform APIs (Telegram, Discord, Instagram). These tools provide the agent with significant system-level capabilities. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The technical references for browser automation describe the use of
page.evaluateandRuntime.callFunctionOn(via the Chrome DevTools Protocol) to execute JavaScript within the context of a browser session. Additionally, the skill usespython3 -cto generate random numeric identifiers for API uploads. These patterns involve the generation and execution of code at runtime to facilitate automation.
Audit Metadata