wiki-capture

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of shell-based CLI tools (obsidian-wiki and qmd) to manage its knowledge base. It executes commands such as obsidian-wiki memory profile set, obsidian-wiki memory todo add, and qmd update based on instructions in the skill definition.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In Step 5b, the skill generates shell commands by interpolating variables extracted from the conversation into command strings (e.g., obsidian-wiki memory todo add "<the open thread>"). This pattern creates a direct path for conversation data to reach the system shell.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to command injection through the processing of untrusted conversation data. If a user provides input containing shell metacharacters (such as ;, `, $(), or unescaped quotes), and the agent extracts this text for a memory update or a todo item, the resulting shell command will execute the injected payload.
  • Ingestion points: The skill scans the entire "current conversation or finding" for extraction (SKILL.md Step 1).
  • Boundary markers: None identified. There are no instructions for the agent to use delimiters or ignore instructions embedded within the conversation text during the extraction phase.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands via os.system or equivalent subprocess calls to interact with the obsidian-wiki and qmd tools.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There are no instructions to escape, validate, or filter the extracted text for shell metacharacters before it is interpolated into the CLI command strings.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 13, 2026, 10:30 AM