wiki-capture
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of shell-based CLI tools (
obsidian-wikiandqmd) to manage its knowledge base. It executes commands such asobsidian-wiki memory profile set,obsidian-wiki memory todo add, andqmd updatebased on instructions in the skill definition. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In Step 5b, the skill generates shell commands by interpolating variables extracted from the conversation into command strings (e.g.,
obsidian-wiki memory todo add "<the open thread>"). This pattern creates a direct path for conversation data to reach the system shell. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to command injection through the processing of untrusted conversation data. If a user provides input containing shell metacharacters (such as
;,`,$(), or unescaped quotes), and the agent extracts this text for a memory update or a todo item, the resulting shell command will execute the injected payload. - Ingestion points: The skill scans the entire "current conversation or finding" for extraction (SKILL.md Step 1).
- Boundary markers: None identified. There are no instructions for the agent to use delimiters or ignore instructions embedded within the conversation text during the extraction phase.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands via
os.systemor equivalent subprocess calls to interact with theobsidian-wikiandqmdtools. - Sanitization: Absent. There are no instructions to escape, validate, or filter the extracted text for shell metacharacters before it is interpolated into the CLI command strings.
Audit Metadata