granola
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses a sensitive local file path containing private meeting transcripts and notes at
~/Library/Application Support/Granola/cache-v3.json. While the skill lacks network capabilities to exfiltrate this data, the exposure of private meeting content to the agent's context is a significant privacy surface. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing a local Python script (
scripts/granola.py) to query and manipulate the file system. The script uses standard libraries (pathlib,json,argparse) and does not invoke external shell commands or subprocesses. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted meeting transcripts and writes them to the Obsidian vault where the agent may later process them.
- Ingestion points: The script reads raw JSON data from the Granola cache file in
scripts/granola.py. - Boundary markers: Absent. Transcripts and notes are written to Markdown files without delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The script performs file reads/writes via
pathliband directory creation. It does not have network access or dynamic execution capabilities. - Sanitization: Filenames are sanitized for illegal characters using regex, but the actual meeting content (notes and transcripts) is interpolated directly into the Markdown template without sanitization or escaping.
Audit Metadata