recall
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive data by reading Claude Code session logs stored in
~/.claude/projects/. These logs contain full conversation histories which may include code snippets and internal details. While necessary for the 'recall' function, this access exposes sensitive user data to the agent context. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/session-graph.pyusessubprocess.runto execute the systemopencommand to launch a browser for viewing the generated session graph HTML file. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from historical session logs, creating an attack surface where old messages could influence the agent's current behavior.
- Ingestion points: Reads all JSONL files in the
~/.claude/projects/directory viascripts/recall-day.pyandscripts/extract-sessions.py. - Boundary markers: The scripts use a
clean_contentfunction with regex patterns to strip system tags like<system-reminder>and<task-notification>, but do not employ robust prompt delimiters to isolate recalled content. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool and file system, and executes local Python scripts. - Sanitization: Content is filtered using regex to remove known system-injected tags before being presented to the agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The file
scripts/session-graph.pyperforms dynamic module loading by usingimportlib.utilto importrecall-day.pyat runtime from a computed file path.
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