update
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from project files and conversation history during the knowledge update process.
- Ingestion points: Git diff output, file content from
docs/,research/, andREADME.md, and the session's dialog history in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Employs a manifest-based tracking system using
expected_countvsverified_countto ensure no items are hallucinated or omitted. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Write,Agent, andSkilltools to modify the local environment and trigger sub-tasks. - Sanitization: Uses a fresh-context sub-agent for review and requires mandatory human confirmation via
AskUserQuestionbefore committing any knowledge changes. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill maintains technical decisions and learned patterns across sessions by writing to persistent memory paths.
- Evidence: It writes to
~/.claude/projects/<project-hash>/memory/MEMORY.mdand~/.claude/skills/learned/. - Purpose: This is the primary stated purpose of the skill to ensure technical context is not lost between sessions.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill supports tool composition by chaining other skills at the end of its lifecycle.
- Evidence: Step 7 parses
$ARGUMENTSto dynamically trigger a follow-up skill, such as a pull request utility, using theSkilltool. - Safety: Pipeline execution is conditional and only occurs after the user has confirmed the previous steps.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local shell tools to verify the integrity of the documentation process.
- Evidence: Utilizes
git diff,grep, andglobto audit sub-agent behavior and ensure that documentation changes accurately reflect the source code state.
Audit Metadata