industry-scanner

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs and executes shell commands in SKILL.md (Phase 2) by directly interpolating values from the client's configuration file (clients/<client>/config/industry-scanner.json). Parameters such as blog_urls, subreddits, reddit_keywords, twitter_query, hn_query, and review_url are passed as arguments to python3 scripts. If these configuration fields contain shell metacharacters or maliciously crafted strings, it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests large volumes of untrusted data from various external platforms to generate strategic business advice and tactics.
  • Ingestion points: Phase 2 of SKILL.md documents data collection from web searches, industry blogs, Reddit, Twitter/X, LinkedIn, Hacker News, RSS feeds, newsletter inboxes, and review sites (G2, Capterra, Trustpilot).
  • Boundary markers: None. The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the fetched content during the categorization and strategy generation phases.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands to trigger scrapers (Phase 2) and write report files to the local file system (Phase 5).
  • Sanitization: None. There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the external content before it is processed by the LLM for relevance rating and opportunity generation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 12, 2026, 02:42 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — industry-scanner