halo-ticket-context
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from Halo tickets and knowledge base articles, which represents a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent's context through tools such as
halo_get_ticket,halo_get_ticket_actions,halo_list_tickets, andhalo_get_kb_articleas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define any delimiters or provide guidance to the agent to ignore or isolate instructions potentially embedded within ticket notes or KB bodies.
- Capability inventory: While the tools described are read-only, the skill references integration with
halo-change-requestfor performing writes and executes a local server scriptmcp-servers/halo-mcp/halo_mcp_server.py(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions for filtering, escaping, or validating external content before it is processed by the AI agent.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent's context through tools such as
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of a local Python script to manage tool interactions.
- Evidence: The skill definition specifies running
python3 -u mcp-servers/halo-mcp/halo_mcp_server.pyto start the MCP server instance (SKILL.md).
- Evidence: The skill definition specifies running
Audit Metadata