journey-report
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/ask.pyusessubprocess.runto execute theclaudeCLI. It facilitates a web-based question box that allows the agent to execute tools such asBash,Read,Glob, andGrepin a headless mode (--permission-mode dontAsk). The instructions also describe how to override security settings usingJOURNEY_ASK_PERMISSION_MODE=bypassPermissionsto allow automated tool execution without user confirmation.- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: TheSKILL.mdfile instructs the agent to generate and execute Python code dynamically via stdin (`python3 - <<'PY'`) to perform complex SQL queries against the local analytics database. This pattern is used to handle follow-up questions that require judgment beyond the static report.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests potentially untrusted data from a local 'lake' of analytics events (including URL paths and page titles) and user-supplied text from a web interface. The absence of explicit boundary markers for data interpolation presents a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Parquet data files processed by
scripts/journey.pyand API POST requests inscripts/serve.py(viascripts/ask.py). - Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt instructions or script logic for the interpolation of data from the analytics lake.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted
Bash,Read,Glob,Grep,Skill,Task, andTodoWritecapabilities for answering follow-up questions. - Sanitization: The engine uses DuckDB parameterization for some queries, but the bridge in
ask.pyonly performs basic string stripping on user-supplied questions.
Audit Metadata