bingx-swap-trade

Fail

Audited by Snyk on Nov 14, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis

CRITICAL E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.

  • Potential prompt injection detected (medium risk: 0.30). The skill is a legitimate BingX trading guide, but its authenticated fetch helper sends the API key and signed requests to a .pro domain alongside the .com primary, a lookalike-style destination the user did not ask for, which is risky without clear evidence of malicious intent.

MEDIUM W009: Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).

  • Direct money access detected (medium risk: 0.30). Direct operation: the skill places, amends, closes and reverses live perpetual-swap orders on BingX (prod-live), and adjusts leverage and margin (Quick Reference, lines 18-25 and 55-58; live market-buy example, lines 320-328). Trades are direct financial operations, so the control test applies. The access control is the service's own HMAC-SHA256 signature authentication, enforced by the BingX API on every trading endpoint. The fetchSigned function signs each request with the API secret and sends the API key in X-BX-APIKEY, so the service validates credentials for this route. This is a qualifying control under the validated-service-credentials standard, even though the credentials may be reusable or exposed. The prod-live CONFIRM step (line 437) is agent-followed and does not count as independent access control. The .pro fallback, redirect: "error" and destination pinning are integrity measures, not payment authorization, and are not relied on here. Because a qualifying control is present, the tier is Medium, not High.

Issues (2)

E004
CRITICAL

Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.

W009
MEDIUM

Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Nov 14, 2026, 04:31 AM
Issues
2