k8s-tool
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external sources, specifically Kubernetes cluster logs, resource descriptions (via
describe), and command outputs. This data is potentially attacker-controlled if applications or services within the cluster are compromised, leading to a risk where the agent might follow instructions embedded in that data. - Ingestion points: Kubernetes resource outputs and logs retrieved via
bun k8s-tool pods,bun k8s-tool logs, andbun k8s-tool describeinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or specific instructions for the agent to disregard natural language commands found within the retrieved Kubernetes data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via
bun, interact with the Kubernetes API, and perform limited command execution within pods via theexecsubcommand. - Sanitization: The skill documentation states that commands are parsed into arguments to avoid shell-controlled interpreters and that sensitive subcommands like
cluster-info dumpand secret reads are blocked. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to facilitate the execution of commands on the host system using the
bunruntime to interface withkubectl. - Evidence: Multiple examples in
SKILL.mddemonstrate executingbun k8s-toolwith various flags, including a restrictedexeccommand that allows runninglsorredis-cliinside containers. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill identifies a dependency on an external package and references a remote code repository.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdreferences the@blogic-cz/agent-toolsdev dependency and links to its repository athttps://github.com/blogic-cz/agent-toolsfor tool installation and updates.
Audit Metadata