git-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data from GitHub PR reviews and comments. In
SKILL.md, Phase 3 and 4 retrieve external content usingbun gh-tool pr threadsandbun gh-tool pr issue-comments. The agent is instructed to "auto-apply" suggestions for bugs, style, or security fixes without user confirmation, enabling a scenario where malicious instructions in a comment could lead to unauthorized code changes being committed and pushed. - Ingestion points: PR review threads and issue comments in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None; the agent is told to directly parse and act on suggestions.
- Capability inventory:
git commit,git push, andbun gh-tool pr reply-and-resolveacrossSKILL.mdandreferences/push-branch-sync.md. - Sanitization: None.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves extensive use of shell commands. It uses standard
gitfor repository management and custom CLI tools likebun gh-toolfor GitHub operations andbut(GitButler) for branch synchronization as described inreferences/push-branch-sync.md.
Audit Metadata