github-triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. It interpolates untrusted data from GitHub (issue titles, bodies, comments) directly into subagent prompt templates.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters via
{body},{title},{author}, and{comments}placeholders in the subagent templates defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are used to isolate untrusted content from the subagent's system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The subagents are granted capabilities to execute
gh-tool,git, and interact with infrastructure like Kubernetes and Sentry via tools listed inallowed-toolsor subagent skill assignments. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation of the fetched GitHub content is performed before interpolation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
gh-toolfor GitHub interactions andgitfor repository management. While these are appropriate for the skill's purpose, they are executed based on plans derived from untrusted input.
Audit Metadata