byted-data-label

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses aggressive intent-matching instructions in the metadata to hijack generic data processing tasks (e.g., 'sentiment analysis', 'translation', 'batch processing'), which may override other specialized agent skills.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests and processes untrusted external data through LLM-based analysis nodes.\n
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via the --file, --raw-data, and --raw-data-file arguments in scripts/seederive.py.\n
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit delimiters or 'ignore' instructions to isolate processed data from system instructions.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for task management (create, list, update, delete) and file uploads through its CLI wrapper script.\n
  • Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of the input content is performed before it is sent to the LLM nodes.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/seederive.py uses the subprocess module to dynamically install the requests library if it is not found in the environment. While this targets a standard library, it involves runtime shell command execution via pip install.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill initiates network connections to a vendor-controlled API gateway at https://sd6qlcofkmfq59riqgli0.apigateway-cn-beijing.volceapi.com and may download packages from the Python Package Index (PyPI) during dependency resolution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 18, 2026, 11:47 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — byted-data-label