byted-volcengine-flink
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to install the
mcporterutility globally usingnpm install -g mcporterand configures the environment to use a private PyPI mirror athttps://mirrors.ivolces.com/pypi/simple/. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The MCP configuration provided in
SKILL.mdusesuvxto download and execute the Flink MCP server directly from the vendor's GitHub repository atgithub.com/volcengine/mcp-server. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill manages Flink applications (including deployment, starting, stopping, and scaling) by executing shell commands via the
mcporterinterface. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes Flink application logs (
list_flink_application_log) and system events. If the Flink job processes untrusted data and logs error details, an attacker could potentially influence the agent's diagnostics or cause it to perform unintended management actions. - Ingestion points: Application logs and events are retrieved in
flink-dev.md,flink-diagnosis.md, andflink-resource.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters used to ensure the agent treats log content strictly as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to dangerous management tools such as
stop_flink_application,start_flink_application, andupdate_flink_application_draft. - Sanitization: The instructions do not define any sanitization or filtering logic for external data retrieved from logs.
Audit Metadata