byted-volcengine-flink

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to install the mcporter utility globally using npm install -g mcporter and configures the environment to use a private PyPI mirror at https://mirrors.ivolces.com/pypi/simple/.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The MCP configuration provided in SKILL.md uses uvx to download and execute the Flink MCP server directly from the vendor's GitHub repository at github.com/volcengine/mcp-server.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill manages Flink applications (including deployment, starting, stopping, and scaling) by executing shell commands via the mcporter interface.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes Flink application logs (list_flink_application_log) and system events. If the Flink job processes untrusted data and logs error details, an attacker could potentially influence the agent's diagnostics or cause it to perform unintended management actions.
  • Ingestion points: Application logs and events are retrieved in flink-dev.md, flink-diagnosis.md, and flink-resource.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters used to ensure the agent treats log content strictly as data rather than instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to dangerous management tools such as stop_flink_application, start_flink_application, and update_flink_application_draft.
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not define any sanitization or filtering logic for external data retrieved from logs.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 21, 2026, 03:15 PM