veadk-skills
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdexplicitly direct the agent to execute a local Python script (save_file.py) to save generated files, which represents an active command execution capability managed by the agent.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data, including user-provided functional requirements and Dify workflow DSL (YAML), to generate code and determine target file paths.\n - Ingestion points: User requirements and Dify DSL YAML files processed according to instructions in
SKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the skill's reference files or instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: Arbitrary file system write access via the
save_file.pyscript and dynamic Python code execution via therun_codetool documented inreferences/common/tools.md.\n - Sanitization: The
save_file.pyscript performs no validation or path sanitization on the--pathargument, making it vulnerable to directory traversal attacks via malicious user input.\n- [PERSISTENCE]: Thesave_file.pyscript enables writing content to arbitrary filesystem paths. An attacker could provide malicious instructions that trick the agent into writing to sensitive persistence-related locations, such as~/.bashrc, shell profiles, or cron directories.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The reference documentation inreferences/common/tools.mdpromotes the use of a built-inrun_codetool for executing Python code. This poses a risk if the agent generates and executes code that has been influenced by adversarial user prompts.
Audit Metadata