chronicle
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from the internet to perform research.
- Ingestion points: Web content retrieved via
WebFetchandWebSearchin SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specific delimiters used to separate untrusted web content from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Writeto save files locally andTaskto delegate work to other agents. - Sanitization: The skill includes a mandatory Phase 3 verification step where factual claims must be cross-checked against sources.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is configured to perform up to 5 web searches and 5 file reads via the
chronicle-researchersub-agent to gather academic and journalistic material. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Tasktool to programmatically delegate the research phase to a sub-agent using a defined prompt template. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses the user's personal voice profile and corpus located at
~/.claude/memory/USER/VOICE.mdand~/.claude/memory/USER/VOICE_CORPUS/. This is a core feature for style calibration but involves reading sensitive personal writing history.
Audit Metadata