jianying-video-gen
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various system-level commands to facilitate video downloading and media processing.
- Evidence in
scripts/jianying_worker.py: Usessubprocess.run(['curl', '-L', '-o', filepath, '-s', '-w', '%{http_code}', mp4_url], ...)to download generated video files from remote URLs. - Evidence in
scripts/jianying_worker.py: Utilizesasyncio.create_subprocess_execto callffmpegandffprobefor video resizing and metadata extraction. - Evidence in
scripts/poll_and_download.py: Also usessubprocess.runwithcurlto fetch video files during polling. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data and user input that could potentially influence the agent's behavior if malicious instructions are embedded.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests a user-provided
--promptvia the CLI and scrapes HTML content/metadata fromxyq.jianying.com(found inscripts/jianying_worker.pyandscripts/find_latest_task.py). - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or "ignore instructions" warnings are present when interpolating user prompts or site content into the automation flow.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands, perform network operations via browser automation, and write files to the local system.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering for the prompt text or the content scraped from the web interface before it is processed by the agent scripts.
Audit Metadata