Zendesk Automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (customer support requests, emails, and ticket subjects) to drive automated workflows. An attacker could embed instructions within a support ticket to manipulate the agent's logic.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mddefines ingestion of 'Support requests', 'Ticket data', and 'Customer information' via tools likezendesk_searchandzendesk_update_ticket. - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided templates. The templates interpolate ticket data directly (e.g.,
{{ticket.requester.name}},{{ticket.subject}}) without explicit delimiters or warnings to the LLM to ignore instructions within the data. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including ticket creation, updating, routing, and integration with external platforms like Slack and JIRA. Specifically, it can
set_group,set_priority,notifyexternal channels, andcreate_jiraissues. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering of customer-provided text before it is processed by the AI for sentiment analysis, intent detection, or auto-response generation.
Audit Metadata