account-priority-buckets
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data from multiple sources, including user-provided CSV lists, CRM notes, and external web content scraped at runtime.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the account list (Step 1.1), first-party evidence such as call quotes and CRM notes (Step 1.5), and public URLs processed via the
scrape-websitefunction (Step 5). - Boundary markers: While the instructions emphasize identifying "verbatim buyer statements," they do not provide explicit structural delimiters (e.g., XML tags or unique string markers) or specific system instructions to ignore potentially malicious commands embedded within the external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell command execution through the
clayCLI and network access via platform-managed functions likescrape-websiteandhttp-api-v2. - Sanitization: The instructions do not describe any sanitization, filtering, or validation of the ingested text before it is interpolated into prompts for hypothesis generation or message drafting.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local shell commands using the
clayCLI to verify platform readiness and retrieve technical metadata. - Evidence: Instructions include running
clay whoami,clay --version,clay routines list,clay routines get, andclay workflows actions schema. - Context: These commands are used for environment setup and discovery of internal Clay functions, which is consistent with the skill's purpose as a platform integration tool for 'clay-run'.
Audit Metadata