hiring-radar
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to utilize the
clayCLI for environmental checks and schema retrieval (e.g.,clay whoami,clay workflows actions list). These commands are authorized vendor tools for theclay-runenvironment used to ensure integration accuracy. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes job posting content (titles and descriptions) from external third-party sources like TheirStack and CPJ, creating a potential surface for adversarial content.
- Ingestion points: External job posting data fetched via API 'arms' described in
SKILL.mdandreferences/arm-routing.md. - Boundary markers: The skill implements a strict verdict logic (Part A and Part B) and requires explicit measurement declarations to structure the agent's output.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution via the
clayCLI and network data retrieval through platform plugins. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or escaping of the external job text is defined prior to processing.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill's frontmatter declares the impact as
touches: read-only. However, the body instructions involve writing command output to/tmp/actions.jsonand provide a mechanism to save user-supplied identifiers to a local file, representing an inconsistency between metadata and actual behavior.
Audit Metadata