consulting-develop

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection. It reads data from user-controllable files such as define/problem-statement.md, define/hmw-questions.md, and persona profiles in the personas/ directory. This content is then interpolated into prompts for parallel Task agents (Personas) in Step 4b and Step 7. Since these agents have access to tools like Write and Bash, a malicious instruction embedded in the project files could potentially influence the agent's actions.
  • Ingestion points: Files in define/, discover/, and personas/ directories.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions for the interpolated content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses Bash, Write, Edit, and Skill (dispatch) tools.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the ingested file content is performed before interpolation into sub-agent prompts.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool to execute a local management script ($CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT/scripts/update-phase.sh) to track project state. This is a standard operational pattern for this skill architecture and does not appear to involve arbitrary command execution of untrusted input beyond the project directory path.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 19, 2026, 04:41 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — consulting-develop