flows-app-brief
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes
git configto retrieve the user's name, email, and the repository's origin URL for metadata population. It also runsnpx @cognite/clito pull the latest versions of review skills used in the certification workflow.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill usesnpxto fetch and execute the latest version of the@cognite/clitool from the npm registry. This is a standard operation within the vendor's development ecosystem to ensure the latest tooling is used.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill performs an automated pre-scan of the repository, reading data fromapp.json,package.json,README.md, and project specifications (specs/**/*.md). This exposes an indirect prompt injection surface where malicious repository content could attempt to influence the agent's behavior. Ingestion points:app.json,package.json,README.md, andspecs/**/*.md. Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify delimiter-based markers for the read content. Capability inventory:Bash,Write,AskQuestion. Sanitization: No explicit sanitization is described. However, the risk is mitigated by a mandatory human-in-the-loop requirement: the agent must present all scanned values as drafts and obtain explicit user confirmation viaAskQuestionbefore saving any data to the finalApp-Brief.mdfile.
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