skill-creator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/run_eval.pyexecutes theclaudeCLI viasubprocess.Popento run skill evaluations on test prompts. This is a legitimate use of command execution to interface with the agent's testing environment.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Theeval-viewer/generate_review.pyscript usessubprocess.runto call thelsofutility to identify and terminate processes occupying its local server port. This process management is localized to the tool's execution.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Theeval-viewer/viewer.htmlfile loads assets from trusted external sources, including Google Fonts and the SheetJS library from a well-known CDN. These downloads are for intended UI functionality.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests user-provided task prompts and intents which are subsequently executed by subagents. While no malicious activity was detected, the skill lacks explicit sanitization for these external inputs.\n - Ingestion points: User-provided eval prompts in
evals/evals.jsonand intent descriptions captured inSKILL.mdduring the development phase.\n - Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt interpolation logic.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill spawns subagents with full agent capabilities to perform the evaluations.\n
- Sanitization: No escaping or validation is performed on the test prompts before they are passed to the subagent.
Audit Metadata