docx

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and process content from external Word documents, which can serve as a vector for malicious instructions targeting the AI agent.
  • Ingestion points: Raw XML content from documents is parsed in scripts/document.py and ooxml/scripts/unpack.py, and content is converted to Markdown via pandoc for agent consumption.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit markers or warnings to the agent to treat document content as untrusted data or to ignore potential instructions embedded within the text.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute CLI tools like git (in ooxml/scripts/validation/redlining.py) and soffice (in ooxml/scripts/pack.py), and can read/write files across the project workspace.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering is performed on text extracted from document XML files before it is processed by the AI.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external binaries to perform document validation and version comparison tasks.
  • Evidence: ooxml/scripts/pack.py uses subprocess.run(["soffice", ...]) to validate document integrity. ooxml/scripts/validation/redlining.py uses subprocess.run(["git", "diff", ...]) to perform character-level comparisons. Both implementations use list-based arguments, which is a secure practice that prevents shell injection.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 06:11 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — docx