pdf

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes PDF documents from external and untrusted sources, which serves as a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: Data is extracted from PDF files using libraries like pypdf, pdfplumber, and pytesseract (OCR) as described in SKILL.md and helper scripts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read and write files to the filesystem and execute shell commands via provided instructions.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit directives for the agent to treat extracted PDF text as untrusted or to ignore instructions embedded within document content.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of extracted text is implemented before processing by the agent.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic code modification of a dependency at runtime.
  • Evidence: scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py implements a monkeypatch on the pypdf.generic.DictionaryObject.get_inherited method to correct specific behavior related to selection list fields in PDF forms.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation provides instructions for the agent to execute various command-line operations.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md and forms.md guide the agent to use CLI tools such as pdftotext, qpdf, pdfimages, and the included custom Python scripts for document manipulation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 06:11 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pdf