Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes PDF documents from external and untrusted sources, which serves as a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Data is extracted from PDF files using libraries like
pypdf,pdfplumber, andpytesseract(OCR) as described inSKILL.mdand helper scripts. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read and write files to the filesystem and execute shell commands via provided instructions.
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit directives for the agent to treat extracted PDF text as untrusted or to ignore instructions embedded within document content.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of extracted text is implemented before processing by the agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic code modification of a dependency at runtime.
- Evidence:
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyimplements a monkeypatch on thepypdf.generic.DictionaryObject.get_inheritedmethod to correct specific behavior related to selection list fields in PDF forms. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation provides instructions for the agent to execute various command-line operations.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdandforms.mdguide the agent to use CLI tools such aspdftotext,qpdf,pdfimages, and the included custom Python scripts for document manipulation.
Audit Metadata